This paper is concerned with the financial performance of the British passenger rail industry since privatisation in the mid-1990s. This experiment, which not merely transferred a state-owned and fully integrated industry into the private sector, but dismantled it into over 100 separate entities, has generated considerable and highly critical academic literature. A major contention of this literature is that, contrary to the predictions of its proponents, privatisation has largely failed to improve efficiency and has actually increased costs, or more exactly, costs are higher than they would have been, had privatisation not taken place. The results, whilst they can only be broadly indicative, are nevertheless clear. Even after conservative assumptions, rail privatisation has resulted in considerable additional costs: it was a major public policy error.
Introduction
This paper is concerned with the financial performance of the British passenger rail industry since it was privatised in the mid-1990s. This experiment has generated a considerable academic literature, much of it highly critical. Proponents of privatisation predicted it would lead to greater efficiency, more responsiveness to passenger needs, and the elimination of state subsidy and direction. Many critics have argued that it has comprehensively failed to deliver, instead producing a structurally fragmented, operationally complex and financially dysfunctional industry. For example, state financial support, forecast to disappear as premium payments made by franchisees on profitable lines outweighed subsidies elsewhere (Crompton and Jupe, 2003a, p. 399) , has actually grown from £2.93bn in 1994/95 to £5.28bn in 2013/14 (at 2013/14 prices -see ORR (2015a)). And, some critics argue, the major beneficiaries of this largesse 'are not the passengers but the owners of the rail companies and the providers of capital [so that] as in all previous sales of state-owned industries, rail privatisation has been used to transfer wealth from the public to the private sector' Crompton, 2006, p. 1062) .
A major contention of the critical literature (reviewed below in Section 3) is that privatisation has failed to improve efficiency and has actually increased costs, or more exactly, costs are higher than they would have been, had privatisation not taken place.
However, although various writers have put forward diverse arguments to support this position, robust data on the overall costs of the (now highly fragmented)
industry have been lacking. Further, a proper assessment of the additional costs (or otherwise) of privatisation can only be made in light of detailed 'counterfactual'
estimates (necessarily speculative) of the costs of the state-run industry if privatisation had not taken place, which as far as the authors are aware, has not been attempted until now.
This paper aims to shed light on this issue by:
1 Deriving robust data, from publicly available sources, on the overall operating costs of British passenger rail services, both before and after privatisation, so that the way in which these costs have varied over time (and in relation to the volume of traffic) can be more clearly understood; 2 Projecting, making reasonable assumptions, what these operating costs would have been in the period from 1996 to 2014 had privatisation not taken place;
and so 3 Producing a reasonable estimate of the increase or decrease in such costs resulting from privatisation over that period.
The paper now proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides a brief outline of the background to privatisation, the restructuring of the railways this involved, and the major actors in the post-privatisation industry; Section 3 provides a review of the literature, concentrating on that which has argued that railway privatisation has led to increased costs; Section 4 gives an analysis of the operating costs of privatised passenger services compared with the counterfactual outcome if BR had been operating these services. Finally, Section 5 provides some conclusions.
The context

A problematic privatisation
Although a defining feature of the Conservative administrations of UK Prime
Ministers Thatcher and Major (1979-97) was the transfer of state-owned companies and utilities to the private sector, there were initially grave reservations about privatising the railways. Margaret Thatcher was particularly mindful of 'the huge political risks' and 'nervous of the public reaction' (Parker, 2012, p. 449 ).
In the 1980s HM Treasury also showed a marked reluctance to embrace rail privatisation. The industry was regarded as a 'large and complex system with many joint costs and independence of different services [which] cannot be easily broken down into separate elements'. Many lines could not be profitable, but would have to be subsidised for social reasons, rendering privatisation difficult if not infeasible (op.
cit., pp. 445-6).
The railways also possess 'several unique features' which made privatisation particularly problematic. Although regarded as a 'natural monopoly' due to 'the fixed costs of the network and the strength of the case for unified operation and vertical integration', the railway industry was in a 'competitive transport market' and in decline, losing market share to road and air (Crompton and Jupe, 2003a, p. 398) In particular, the industry has very high fixed costs: about half of all operating costs relate to the infrastructure (track, signalling and stations) varying little with the volume of traffic. This is also true of utilities such as gas or electricity, but whereas the latter 'provide an (almost) universal and essential service' (Shaoul, 2004, p. 30) and so can 'spread fixed costs across many users', in contrast, rail passenger services are 'not universal and unavoidable', and in the absence of adequate demand cannot fully recover these costs (Crompton and Jupe, ibid.) . Full recovery from passengers would entail self-defeating fare increases that would 'choke off demand', inflict economic and social damage and be 'politically unacceptable.'
Closure of subsidy-dependent lines would also have political and social consequences (Shaoul, 2002, p. 53) .
When a commitment to privatise the railways was finally made by the Major government (in the Conservatives' Election Manifesto in 1992) these problems were simply ignored. The subsequent White Paper, a slim document of 21 pages 'rather lightweight' on the economic rationale behind the privatisation plans (Preston, 1996, p. 2) blandly asserted that a privatised industry would 'mean more competition, greater efficiency and a wider choice of services more closely tailored to what customers want' and 'provide greater opportunities to … reduce costs, without sacrificing quality' (Department of Transport (DoT), 1992, pp. 1, 5). But evidence to support these assertions was distinctly lacking Crompton, 2006, p. 1037) .
Apart from a general predisposition to assume that 'private' must mean better, the government had a number of objectives in privatising the railways: to eliminate or at least reduce public subsidy, to raise money from the sale of assets (Crompton and Jupe, 2003a, p. 399) ; to transfer decision-making and risk to the private sector [Transport Select Committee (TSC), 2006, para. 25] ; and, although this was never stated publicly, to weaken the position of the unions (Parker, 2012, p. 463 ) on the assumption that it 'would be easier to discipline the workforces of a fragmented industry' (Cole and Cooper, 2006, p.609) .
However, once the decision in principle had been taken, the guiding idea or rationalisation was to introduce 'as much competition as possible' into the industry (Wolmar, 2005, p. 61; see also DoT, 1992, para. 25) . This turned the exercise into the 'most complex' of the Thatcher/Major privatisations (Crompton and Jupe, 2003a, p. 398) , involving the dismantling of a fully integrated state-owned corporation, British Rail (BR), into over 100 separate companies for sale to the private sector, an 'experiment in fragmenting a railway on a scale never contemplated anywhere else in the world before or since' (Parker 2012, p. 495) .
The Privatisation Structure
The key players in the new fragmented industry were: an infrastructure company, initially Railtrack, but later replaced by Network Rail (NR); train operating companies (TOCs) which were awarded franchises to operate passenger services in particular areas; rolling stock companies (ROSCOs) which supplied locomotives and carriages to the TOCs; and freight operators (FOCs) (see Gourvish, 2002 (Jupe and Crompton, 2006) .
The Privatised Industry and its Costs
Framing the discussion: BR versus the privatised industry
A decade after privatisation, Gourvish (2008, p. 287) concluded that the government's assumption, that BR's costs 'were too high and could be reduced substantially by a private sector approach has proved to be erroneous'. Similarly the Official History of Privatisation (Parker, 2013, p. 319) Passenger traffic has greatly increased since the mid-1990s as shown in Figure 1 using several different metrics. More trains are running on what is substantively the same network; the growth in passenger traffic is greater, and the growth in passenger revenue greater still. Given the railways' high fixed costs, this might have been expected to lead to a fall in unit costs (defined here as the cost of carrying one passenger one km) as it did when BR's traffic increased in the 1980s (see Figure 5 ).
However, this does not appear to have happened.
In his value-for-money study 3 , Sir Roy McNulty (2011, pp. 18-19) (Shaoul, 2004, p. 29; ORR, 2013, p. 7 ). BR's subsidy was 0.16% of GDP (against a European average of 0.52%) and BR has been described as 'perhaps the most financially successful railway in Europe' (Crompton and Jupe, 2003b, p. 619 ; see also Harris and Godward, 1997, p. 52; Shires et al., 1997, p. 1) . It is plausible that BR would have further reduced its unit costs with the increase in traffic experienced in the last 20 years.
Railway Industry: Competition and Franchising
The purpose of separating infrastructure (track and stations) from the provision of passenger services, certainly on the part of the Treasury's Privatisation Unit and Sir Christopher Foster (the Transport secretary's special advisor), was to enable competition between train operators. Indeed, the original idea was that TOCs would bid for the right to use particular train paths at particular times -analogous to the way in which landing/take-off slots can be bid for at airports (Shaw, 2000, p. 23; Gourvish, 2002, p. 390; Pollitt and Smith, 2002, p. 467; Wolmar, 2005, pp. 52-53; Parker, 2012, pp. 453-5) .
A franchise system was embraced as the only means whereby competition, albeit periodic 'competition for the market as opposed to competition in it' could be sustained when the 'open access' model was abandoned as unworkable (Domberger and Jensen, 1997, p. 687) . Franchises were kept short, typically seven years, to allow 'more frequent exposure to the market' (DoT, 1993, para. 14) , and passenger rolling stock was transferred to the ROSCOs and then leased to train operators, who thus need little capital commitment, reducing barriers to entry.
The Train Operators
However, over time competitive pressures on incumbent TOCs have attenuated.
McCartney and Stittle (2011, p. 2) argue that the 'cost and complexity of bidding for a franchise [constitute] significant barriers to entry ' and McNulty (2011, pp. 63, 67) even cites these costs (about £20m per franchise awarded 4 ) as a significant saving from his proposed lengthening of franchise periods (to 'at least 15 years'). On the other hand Alastair Morton, Chair of the Shadow Strategic Rail Authority 6 , argued as early as 1999 for 10-to-20 year franchises to give TOCs sufficient incentive to make long-term investments (Poole and Dyer, 1999, p. 16) ; similarly the TSC (2006, para. 90; 2009, paras. 18-19) has urged franchise periods of up to 15 years, with pre-defined break points at which the franchise could be withdrawn if specified targets had not been met. McNulty (2011, p. 63) argues that longer franchises would give TOCs more incentive 'to innovate on services, make long-term investment [and] address difficult industrial relations challenges'.
These arguments have some force, but only if one forgets that short franchises were instituted precisely to ensure competition, the alpha of the industrial restructuring at
privatisation. An oligopolistic train operator who is awarded a 25-year franchise, terminable early only if it fails to meet contractually-specified conditions, might be under regulatory pressure, depending on how aggressively the contract is policed, but is not facing any competitive pressure.
Since March 2013 there has been a 'proliferation of Direct Awards', where franchises have been extended without a competitive process: six such awards had been made by October 2014 (Butcher, 2015, p. 6 ) and a further four in the following year. The National Audit Office (NAO 2015, paras 3, 10) argues that Direct Awards are 'a sensible temporary measure [and the DfT] has contained risks to value for money from these non-competed contracts by limiting the number and duration, with most lasting between two and three years.' Yet the Treasury had originally wanted tendered franchises as short as three years to maximise competitive pressure, a plan only abandoned when it proved unacceptable to investors (see Crompton, 2006, p. 1043; Parker, 2012, p. 471) .
Other flaws in the structuring of the privatised industry as they affect the TOCs have been identified by researchers. Lease charges to the ROSCOs and TACs, which are both largely fixed, constitute most of their operating costs: the proportion they can actually control is as low as 6-11% so they have 'little incentive to run a more efficient railway' (Taylor and Sloman, pp. 23, 59 ) and actually focus on revenue 7 (McNulty, 2011, p. 59) . Preston (1996, pp. 9-10) argues that the optimal railway network (i.e. which minimised operating costs) would be about 4,000km, running 120m train-km pa, implying that BR should have been broken up into no more than 'three or four network operators' which was 'the configuration of the industry prior to nationalization in 1947 and, in a different format [the way BR] was evolving through sectorization' in its final years. Inviting tenders for 25 passenger franchises 8 kept down the size and cost of individual franchises, encouraged tenderers to come forward, and helped make the privatisation a success, but pushed up overall costs (Crompton and Jupe, 2003b, p. 623; Crompton, 2006, pp. 1040-2 TOCs are aware from experience that the Government (in order to avoid playing its role as the 'operator of last resort') will spend considerable time and effort, and even provide additional support, if a franchise runs into difficulty.' Indeed, TOCs were guaranteed additional support should actual passenger revenues fell below the levels specified in their franchise tender documents 9 (ibid., pp. 47, 94).
TOCs are special purpose vehicles (SPVs), wholly-owned subsidiaries of the successful tenderer, created to operate a given franchise, which can be closed down without wider financial consequences. Franchisees are required to post performance bonds, forfeit if the contract is broken, but these are relatively small, 7 Strangely, McNulty also notes that that the 'efficiency of the best performing [TOCs is] typically some 30% better than [that of] poorer performing companies' as if there were room for large efficiency gains by the latter. These differences must be due to the 'structural factors' mentioned earlier, such as the use of management ('cost plus') contracts in some franchises and the years 'remaining on a franchise' (op. cit., pp. 34-35). 8 Initially, it was planned to have more, 'reflecting pressure from those who wanted to create a competitive railway', but investors required larger franchises (Parker, 2012, p.468) . 9 Bowman et al. (2013, pp. 93-4) note that in 2011/12, 'cap and collar' revenue support was claimed by 8 out of the 18 franchises, describing this as 'extraordinarily generous'. However, since 2012, the 'collar' support mechanism has been primarily related to exogenous factors such as changes in GDP.
and no deterrent to abandonment, especially if the TOC has committed to make substantial premium payments. Indeed, Bowman et al. (2013, p. 14) argue that the bidding process encourages 'predatory contractualism' where tenderers 'game the system with optimistic projections of passenger numbers and back loaded premium payments ... take easy profits in the early years and then walk away to avoid large premium payments'.
McCartney and Stittle (2011) The above discussion concerns only franchisee TOCs. The ORR can authorise 'access to the network on certain routes for a specified time' by Open Access
Operators, who compete with the franchise operators but 'pay lower track charges' based on marginal costs. The CMA has argued that more widespread use of Open Access Operators could provide 'a greater degree of competition 'in' the market
[leading] to a reduction in costs ' (2016, pp. 13, 20) . However, historically, Open Access Operators have accounted for only a trivial proportion of passenger-mileage: just 0.7% in 2013/14 (ORR, 2015c) and so have been ignored for the purposes of this paper.
The ROSCOs
The rationale for vesting BR's passenger rolling stock with the ROSCOs was that the useful life of these assets (up to 40 years) was far longer than the franchises being tendered and, absent a functioning second-hand market, TOCs would be unwilling to invest in new rolling stock when they had no guarantee that franchises would be renewed. Three ROSCOs were established to create a competitive industry, and in theory, TOCs could purchase rolling stock or lease it elsewhere. Thus the ROSCOs were left unregulated and 'subject only to general competition law' (ORR, 1998a, Forward), despite being indirect beneficiaries of public subsidies via the TOCs. In practice, the ROSCOs, whose very existence is due to the way the railways were privatised, have been able to 'deliver exceptional returns to their investors, particularly so in the first few years after privatisation' 10 despite their very low level of risk ' (McCartney and Stittle, 2012, pp. 155, 165) . Rolling stock is 'highly nonsubstitutable' between franchises and there is virtually no surplus available. The TOCs have little leverage over the ROSCOs on charges, and generally treat them as a 'pass through' cost to the DfT (McNulty, 2011, pp. 235-6) .
The government has now tacitly conceded that the rolling stock market is not functioning as originally intended i.e. a 'fully competitive market for the provision of new and second-hand rolling stock [with] no public sector intervention' (DoT, 1993, paras. 4, 19) , and has become actively involved in procuring rolling stock e.g. for the next generation of Intercity 11 and Thameslink trains. Here the government has taken 'the lead' because of 'structural issues and the scale of the procurements' (NAO, 2014, p. 6) , and assumed 'all the risk' of a £10.5bn contract: if passenger demand 10 In 1997-99 the operating profits of the ROSCOs were equivalent to about 15% of overall passenger revenue (McCartney and Stittle, 2012, p. 162; ORR, 2006, p. 17) . 11 InterCity trains are express services, predominantly from London to major UK cities; Thameslink trains are suburban services through London.
forecasts prove incorrect 'taxpayers would have to cover the costs of any financial shortfall' (op. cit., pp. 3-4).
Infrastructure holder
The railway infrastructure of track, signalling and stations, the vast bulk of BR's assets, were transferred on 1 April 1994 to a separate company, Railtrack, which was floated on the stock exchange two years later. It was set up, following recommendations from the consultants McKinsey, as an 'engineering-free corporation' (Gourvish, 2002, p. 402) , which would buy in any necessary skills and expertise 12 . In fact it became, as the Rail Regulator himself put it, 'a less than competent client of its infrastructure contractors' (TSC, 2004b, Q.186), excessively dependent on consultants, on whom it spent at least £225 million in 2001/02, or almost 50 per cent of its wage bill' (Crompton and Jupe, 2007, p. 910) . This was a striking contrast to the 'Big Four' railway companies in the inter-war years, whose engineers were the 'dominant management grouping' not the accountants as in much of British industry (Lawrenson, 1992, p. 46) .
The directors of the newly-floated Railtrack 'did not did not hide the fact that its priorities were not those of the nationalised railway'. They aimed to generate returns to shareholders, who received generous dividends (£709 million between 1995/96 and 2000/01), and a rising share price (from 390p at flotation to a peak of 1768p).
The directors 'incentivised' themselves with a profit-linked bonus scheme and share options worth £1.8m at the peak share price (McCartney and Stittle, 2015, pp. 115-6;  see also Wolmar, 2005, pp. 92-5) .
However, in practice the actual focus of the Railtrack's management was not on maintaining the infrastructure or controlling costs, but on extracting concessions from the Rail Regulator. Here Railtrack was spectacularly successful: e.g. the 40% increase in revenue from the 'breathtakingly generous' settlement for the control period 13 2001-6 (Crompton and Jupe, 2003c, p. 15 had 'no effective incentive to enhance and develop the network in an entrepreneurial manner'. It was spending more on the infrastructure than BR but presiding over 'a decline in the underlying quality of the network' (Crompton and Jupe, 2003a, p. 413) .
After Railtrack collapsed into administration in 2001, the Rail Regulator accused the company of having 'had ... almost a policy, certainly latterly, of neglecting their assets' (Shaoul, 2004, p. 34 ; see also Crompton and Jupe, 2007, p. 911; TSC, 2002, Q799) .
The government then sponsored a new entity which took over the railway infrastructure in October 2002. NR is a company limited by guarantee: with no equity it is funded entirely by debt. This was highly controversial: it was widely asserted in the press and by the political opposition that NR was only set up as a technically private company so its debt could be excluded from government (Public Sector Net Debt) borrowing figures (McCartney and Stittle, 2006) .
However, some have argued that the way NR is structured has had malign effectsand driven up costs. NR was unable to borrow without government support. The government was unwilling to give a formal guarantee, but let it be understood that the Strategic Rail Authority (SRA) would make a £7bn contingency fund available if necessary: much significance was invested in the distinction between 'guarantee'
and 'underwrite'. The result was that NR has had to pay a premium over government borrowing rates, incurring substantial additional costs 14 .
Critics have also pointed to NR's funding regime whereby the Rail Regulator fixes
TACs for quinquennial periods with the result that NR's incentive is merely to hold costs below the regulatory settlement's limit, with 'little pressure to work out the most cost-effective solution on particular projects' (Crompton and Jupe, 2007, p. 922 ).
NR's members meet infrequently and cannot control the directors: indeed a majority are appointed by the directors while others (e.g. TOCs) have special interests to pursue (Crompton and Jupe, 2007, p. 918; McCartney and Stittle, 2006, pp. 144-45) .
The TSC (2004a) concluded that the members were not 'exercising an effective control of the company' and that the 'ownership structure is unacceptably weak' (op.
cit., para. 59; Summary).
McNulty (2011, pp. 59-60) 15 Malcolm Rifkind, McGregor's predecessor as Transport Secretary had rejected a separate track authority on the grounds that it would 'invest to maximise the quality of the rail infrastructure and simply pass on the costs either to train users or the taxpayer' (Parker, 2012, p. 451 ).
Industry Fragmentation
A number of writers have argued that the key flaw in the privatisation of the railways was the fragmentation of a hitherto integrated industry. The TSC's (1995, p. 172) forecast that these factors would add £715m pa to the industry's costs was rejected by the Department of Transport, but turned out to be 'a major underestimate in the light of the actual impact of privatisation' (Crompton and Jupe, 2003b, p. 630) . Thus BR's interest charges were, in theory, available for reinvestment in the industry (Shaoul, 2006, p. 157) Railtrack and the ROSCOs, respectively' and argue that that 'interface costs added at least £3 billion per year' to rail industry costs' (see Table 1 ). Jupe and Funnell (2015, p. 14) claim that the industry's 'infrastructure costs have tripled since privatisation, with the key driver being substantial interface costs.'
McNulty (2011) focused on achieving economies within the existing industry structure and did not make comparisons with BR. Nevertheless, he also suggests that the fragmentation of the industry has driven up costs, due to misaligned strategies and incentives in different parts of the industry and misaligned and shortterm planning and budgeting cycles, which represent a barrier to the whole system approach favoured by his study (although the obvious whole system approachrenationalisation -is curtly dismissed). McNulty repeatedly points to a fragmented structure as a cause of increased costs e.g. highlighting that industry relationships are based on contracts, for example between … train operators and NR … rather than partnerships [which] can lead to inflexibility and confrontation [and] slow and ineffective decision-making (2011, p. 49, 84, 284-6 ; see also Atkins Consultancy (2011) which is cited in support).
Ironically, replacing the integrated command structure of BR with 'contractual relationships between free-standing autonomous bodies' which would allow competition was precisely the economic rationale for the structure created by privatisation, as expounded by its 'chief architect', Sir Christopher Foster (2003, p. 6;  see also Preston, 1999, p. 9) . two experiments. The first was with private ownership … The second was the imposition of a particular vertically disintegrated structure … that could not easily be changed and that had never emerged before as an outcome of market processes (Booth, 2006, p. 15 ).
Academics such as Newbery (2006) Thus government ministers were not as sanguine about the beneficent impact of privatisation as they claimed, which may explain why they went to such lengths to manipulate the outcome of the privatisation to ensure its apparent success. Inter alia, responsibility for the upkeep of about 1,000 bridges (a liability with a present value of about £1bn) was quietly transferred from BR to local authorities; more than £1bn of BR's debt was written off; Railtrack was given a present of £707m of BR's tax losses (worth about £230m at prevailing tax rates) (see Harris & Godward, 1997, p. 132; Shaoul, 2004, p. 31; Crompton and Jupe, 2003, pp. 626-7; Parker, 2012, p. 487).
Analysis of cost data
The approach in this study
Generally, previous estimates of the additional costs of the privatised railway 
The data sets utilised
The Nationalised Industry -to 1993/94
Operating costs of BR's rail activities from 1980/81 to 1993/94 are shown in Figure 2 , extracted from its accounts, which permit a breakdown into Passenger Traffic and other sectors.
The Interregnum -1994/95 to 1996/97
The process of privatisation was prolonged: the necessary restructuring of BR began in 1994/95 and the last franchise was awarded from February 1997 (Curwen, 1997, p. 56) . Reliable cost information for this period proved very difficult to find due to the industry restructuring, so no cost figures have been estimated.
The Privatised Industry -from 1997/98
Aggregate annual financial information for the railway industry is available, but only from 2010/2011 (ORR, 2012) . In principle, it should be sufficient to aggregate the operating costs of the TOCs from their published accounts, inasmuch as each TOC is a special purpose vehicle created to operate a given franchise by the successful tenderer, and the costs of other actors will pass through them 17 . Initially, there were 25 TOCs, one per franchise, albeit these were owned by only 13 different tenderers (Curwen, 1997, p. 56) , but after some consolidation as the DfT reconfigured the franchise map, the number had been reduced to 19 by 2013/14, with just 11 operators in various permutations (DfT, 2015) .
The ORR receives monthly management accounts from each TOC, but this information is 'exempt from disclosure under s.44' of the Freedom of Information Act since the ORR is prohibited (under s.145 of the Railways Act, 1993) from publishing 'information about a business … that has been obtained in the exercise of (its)
functions as an economic regulator.' 18 .
This study has therefore extracted information from the publicly available financial statements of franchisee TOCs. The DfT (or earlier the SRA) has directly operated passenger services, where a franchise was revoked due to poor performance (e.g.
Connex South East in 2003)
or abandoned by the franchise-holder (e.g. the earliermentioned East Coast Main Line), but in these cases the operators were companies wholly-owned by the DfT and have been treated like other TOCs.
At first sight it would appear to be sufficient to aggregate the operating costs of the TOCs for the period of their franchises, but there are two complicating factors:
1 Government subsidies to the infrastructure holder (currently NR) mean that the latter may not recover all its costs through TACs. Indirectly subsidising passenger traffic in this way enables franchises to appear more profitable than they really are, and the privatised system a 'success' (Bowman, 2015) . Such unrecharged operating costs of passenger rail services need to be added to the costs appearing in the TOCs' own accounts, but 2 The accounts of Railtrack/NR, unlike those of BR, do not clearly indicate a breakdown of costs between passenger and freight traffic. Whilst the former accounts for the majority of railway revenue and costs, the latter is still significant in absolute terms, and is supported by relatively heavy government subsidies, mostly paid to the infrastructure holder (McCartney and Stittle, 2013) .
So to permit a tolerably accurate estimate of passenger operating costs, a computation has been made of overall industry costs (both passenger and freight)
and an estimate of freight costs deducted from it.
This computation can be represented as: 
Freight operating costs
As explained, the operating costs of the privatised freight industry cannot be directly computed from published financial information. Instead, real unit costs have been calculated from BR's financial statements (see Figure 3 ) and a conservative estimate of £0.10 per tonne/km (at 2013/14 prices) based thereon has been applied to postprivatisation freight volumes. In other words, the privatised freight industry is assumed to make zero efficiency gains between 1994/95 and 2013/14. This may overestimate freight industry costs -and so lead to an underestimate of passenger costs.
The resulting overall passenger traffic costs are shown in Table 2 and Figure 4 , along with the volume of traffic (in passenger-kms). 19 The DfT does not insist that FOCs be dedicated SPVs but the scale of their other activities is relatively small, so including their overall costs does significantly distort the results. It is of course impossible to be certain how BR would have performed after the mid1990s had privatisation not taken place. However, based on its record in the 1980s, it would seem highly likely that with the great increase in traffic experienced after the mid-1990s, BR would have been able to reduce unit costs even more rapidly, although by how much must be a matter of conjecture. Table 3 shows these projections of BR costs together with actual industry costs from Table 2 . These suggest that the privatised industry is now outperforming the hypothetical BR -but only after 2010/11, and only if it is assumed that BR would have made no improvement in efficiency after 1993/94.
On each of the three scenarios posited in Table 3 , the privatised industry has cost more, over the whole period from 1997/98 to 2013/14, as shown in Table 4 . 
Discussion and Conclusion
Overall rail passenger operating costs 1997/98 to 2013/14
The railways have very high fixed costs and one might have expected that the expansion of passenger traffic from the mid-1990s would have reduced unit costs and even created a profitable industry without need of public subsidy.
But, as the literature critical of rail privatisation has highlighted, this has not happened: costs and subsidy have both increased. Privatisation has inflated costs: more exactly, given the volume of passenger traffic, the privatised industry has incurred higher costs than would have been incurred by BR.
However, whilst the critical literature reviewed in Section 3 has proffered a variety of estimates of, and explanations for cost inflation, it lacks a robust empirical case demonstrating the scale of the additional costs generated by privatisation.
The purpose of this paper has been to test and quantify this assertion, on a tolerably In his report McNulty (2011, p. 43) comments that:
[M]aking any such estimate of savings inevitably requires significant simplification and judgement. The results should therefore be interpreted only as broadly indicative of the financial value that could be released through the implementation of the Study's proposals.
Similar caveats apply with the present work, particularly given the access and restrictions to some information from industry bodies (such as the ORR), but the authors similarly argue that their results are 'broadly indicative' of the additional costs imposed by privatisation.
The present work suggests that these costs have been enormous. The problems revealed by the Hatfield crash drove costs, already higher than those of BR, to extraordinary levels. The quasi-nationalised NR, despite its flawed structure, has managed to bring infrastructure costs under control, but real unit costs have only fallen below pre-privatisation levels from 2011/12 onwards. costs of 1.8% pa in its last 14 years although traffic was virtually unchanged. Given the very high fixed costs of the railways and the growth in passenger traffic after the mid-1990s, it would be plausible to argue that BR would have achieved an even more rapid reduction in unit costs: even the most favourable (to BR) assumption of a 2% pa reduction in Table 3 may be somewhat conservative.
Finance costs and Freight
The figures estimated above refer only to the operating costs of the privatised industry/BR, ignoring finance costs. Yet as Table 5 shows, the debt and finance costs of NR alone dwarf those of BR, and NR's interest of £1.53bn in 2013/14 is equivalent to 16% of total industry operating costs. Sources: Crompton and Jupe, 2003, p. 401; BR, 1994 , NR, 2014 From 1 September 2014, NR was re-classified by the Office of National Statistics as a Central Government body in the UK National Accounts (Joloza, 2013) and its debt now appears 'on the government's balance sheet' (Hansard, 2013) . From 4 July 2014, new debt, or the refinancing of existing debt, is arranged through the DfT, but NR is still paying a premium over government rates on pre-existing debt. Moreover,
Stephen Glaister, Chair of the ORR, has recently (June 2016) admitted that NR's debt 20 , now around £40bn, is 'never going to be repaid', so whilst it has historically been described as 'financing' it is, in fact, 'funding' (Modern Railways, 2016, p. 6) . In other words, much of it will be written off in NR's books and assumed by the state -it is effectively subsidy and, in practice, NR's costs are correspondingly higher than in the above analysis.
FOCs pay TACS based on marginal costs only on most routes, implying a crosssubsidy from the TOCs whose charges are based on 'full-cost'. However, FOCS only pay a fraction of these marginal costs: in 2010/11 these were estimated at £200-250m but actual TACS paid were only £43m (McCartney and Stittle, 2013, p. 326 ). Yet in that same year industry operating costs were estimated, by projecting forward from costs disclosed in the accounts of BR, at £1,730m, whilst the FOCs' operating costs were £840m (both at 2010/11 prices) implying a cross-subsidy from the TOCs, of about £640-690m pa, a cost imposed on the passenger rail sector which does not appear in this analysis.
Cost Structure
As noted above, this paper's estimates of the extent to which privatisation has increased the overall costs of operating rail passenger services (although based on published accounting data and plausible, even conservative assumptions), can only be taken as 'broadly indicative'. By the same token, these projections do not explain why this might have happened.
An attempt to provide an explanation might begin by looking into the composition of operating costs before and after privatisation, identifying which costs in particular have been driven up. However, the restructuring of the industry at privatisation means that a comparison of cost categories between BR and its successor companies is far from straightforward and is not attempted in this paper.
Nevertheless, the scale of the increase in costs, even on conservative assumptions, implies that it cannot be due to the need of all the actors in the value chain to generate a profit margin and the 'leakage' of dividends and interest payments.
Rather, in the opinion of the authors, the cause is more likely to be found in the perverse decision to dismantle an industry that was historically vertically integrated for very good reasons, and the dysfunctionality of the resulting structure.
It is striking that NR has been criticised, e.g. by McNulty, for its lack of private sector incentives, i.e. the need to generate a return for shareholders, when the directors of its predecessor, Railtrack, were positively obsessed with the share price and dividend rates. Indeed, daily updates on the share price were posted on signal box noticeboards, and even after the Hatfield crash, when Railtrack reported a loss of £314m, the directors approved a dividend of £138m to reassure investors (Wolmar, 2005, p. 95; McCartney and Stittle, 2015, p. 116) . Apparently, the choice is between Railtrack's 'neglect' of the infrastructure and NR's 'gold-plating' of the same.
The evidence and analysis presented in this paper strongly suggest that in cost terms alone, the dismantling of British Rail was ill-judged and has proved to be a major public policy error. Although BR was performing very well when compared to its European counterparts, proponents of privatisation argued that the private sector would improve efficiency and provide 'better value for money' over the 'dead hand' of the state. But this was largely an illusion, and indeed now, in a farcical twist that nobody could have foreseen, many of the franchises are actually run, not by private enterprise but by state-owned European rail operators -the very ones that BR was out-performing in the 1980s 21 .
